The International Patent Propensity Divide by Benoliel, Daniel
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 4
10-1-2013
The International Patent Propensity Divide
Daniel Benoliel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Benoliel, The International Patent Propensity Divide, 15 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 49 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol15/iss1/4
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
VOLUME 15, ISSUE 1: OCTOBER 2013
THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT PROPENSITY DIVIDE
Daniel Benoliel
This Article contributes conceptually and empirically towards
an innovation-based growth theory for developing countries. The
proposed theory adheres to the growing importance given by
theoreticians and policy makers alike to re-visiting the
neoclassical economics "one size fits all" innovation policy
propagated by current international intellectual property
instruments.
In arguing for an innovation-based growth theory, the Article
offers a unique statistical country panel data model for comparing
patent propensity rates as a proxy for national innovation over
sixteen years (1996-2011) between two groups of countries
straddling the developing-developed countries divide: "Emerging
Economies" and "Advanced Economies." The International
Monetary Fund has labeled certain developing countries as
"Emerging Economies, " which are hotbeds of meaningful
innovation within the developing world, and others as "Advanced
Economies, " which includes most of the countries belonging to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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The model corroborates a statistical difference between a
relatively high propensity to patent in Advanced Economies and a
lower propensity to patent in neighboring Emerging Economies.
The model further corroborates earlier related findings whereby
countries today are converging to multiple innovation-based
growth equilibria rather than to a single "one size fits all" model
in their propensity to patent as a proxy for domestic innovation. In
addition, the model confirms that Emerging Economies indeed are
slowly, yet steadily, converging towards Advanced Economies in
their propensity to patent.
I. INTRODUCTION
The effects of patenting on economic growth among countries
are unclear. This Article offers a conceptual and empirical
contribution thereof, focusing on an innovation-based growth
theory for developing countries. The theory adheres to the
growing critique by theoreticians and policy makers towards the
present-day "one size fits all" innovation policy propagated by
current international intellectual property-related organs of the
United Nations ("UN"). These include the World Trade
Organization's ("WTO") signing of the Agreement on the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") and the
innovation-related policy by the World Health Organization
("WHO"). It further includes recent policy initiatives by the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"). Such equal
country innovation policy is also embedded in the Washington
Consensus standard macroeconomic reform package for crisis-
wracked developing countries promoted by the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), World Bank, and the United States
Treasury Department.
This Article aims to measure patenting activity among
countries by comparing patent propensity rates between two
groups of countries adjoining the developmental divide between
developing countries and developed ones. In so doing, the Article
contributes towards a theory that could replace the "one size fits
all" innovation-based economic growth equilibrium: a theory that
50 [VOL. 15: 49
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examines two tentative equilibria across the archetypical
development divide.
The IMF has labeled the country clusters across the
development divide as the twenty-four Emerging Economies
heading the developing world and the thirty-two Advanced
Economies that are mostly member countries of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"). To
approximate innovation of state-of-the-art technology by these two
country clusters, the Article corresponds with Ed Mansfield's
seminal definition of the propensity to patent as "the percentage of
patentable inventions that are patented."' The empirics of patent
propensity rates across countries analyzed in this Article thus flow
naturally from the central role given to the measurement of
research and development in relation with patenting itself. That is,
patenting can be seen as a proxy for domestic innovation and
economic growth among countries.
This Article corroborates the transition that growth theory has
gone through in recent years: From growth theory's adherence to
innovation-based economic growth as a linear historical process of
technological development or innovation, to a non or less-linear
innovation theory.2 In the past, "[d]eveloping countries were
deemed to be at an earlier stage than more advanced economies
' Edwin Deering Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,
3 MGMT. SC. 173, 176 (1986).
2 See generally STEPS CENTRE, Innovation, Sustainability, Development: A
New Manifesto, A NEW MANIFESTO (2010), http://www.anewmanifesto.org/
manifesto 2010/; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT (2005). For a historical account
of the linear theory of innovation, see Benoit Godin, The Linear Model
ofInnovation: The Historical Construction of an Analytical Framework, 31 Scl.
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 639, 639-45, 645-60 (2006). Godin explains that
historically, the linear model was not an actual scientific model of innovation or
intellectual progress, but rather a variety of individuals such as scientists seeking
funding and economists advising government agencies. They have constructed
the linear model of innovation to classify research activities, establish a
connection between basic and applied research and eventually commercial
activities.
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along the linear path of historical progress."' This course naturally
led to a neoclassical economics policy inclination towards a "one
size fits all" international intellectual property instrument for
fostering innovation-based economic growth worldwide.
The neoclassical economics-based innovation policy draws a
parallel to the creation of the United Nations country-equal
innovation policy-related organs as said.
Against the backdrop of the demise of the Washington
Consensus theoretical setting, a growing theoretical inclination
towards a non or at least less-linear innovation theory and policy is
evolving. Riding the mounting gale of non-linear innovation
dialectics, one distinct theory already has started to transform into
policy at the OECD and at the European Union ("EU"). It is
labeled as the "National Systems of Innovation" theory.' The
National Systems of Innovation theory explains how innovation
and technology development are the result of a complex set of
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 40 (Erika Kraemer-Mbula & Watu Wamae, eds., 2010).
See generally ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1966); W. W. RoSTOw, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A NON- COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (3d ed. 1991).
4 For major academic contributions, see Bengt-Ake Lundvall, Product
Innovation and User-Producer Interaction, in 31 INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH SERIES, 28-29 (1985). See generally NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF
INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION AND INTERACTIVE LEARNING
(Bengt-Ake Lundvall, ed., 1993); NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Richard R. Nelson, ed., 1993); P. PATEL & K.
PAVITr, The Nature and Economic Importance of National Innovation Systems,
STI REv, 14, (1994) (offering a comparison between the United States and
European countries based on the nature of their national innovation systems);
Chris Freeman, The "National System of Innovation" in Historical Perspective,
19 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 5 (1995) (offering analysis of innovation theory based
on national and regional reference instead of a globalized "one-size-fits-all"
one).
For a general overview, see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 3, at 41 n.3 ("The
elements of the national innovation system (NIS) have close similarities to
structuralist views stressing that development is neither linear nor sequential, but
a unique process shaped by a specific history, culture and socioeconomic
context.").
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domestic relationships among various state institutions:'
enterprises, universities, and government research institutes.
Innovation, we are thus told, is and ought to remain subject to
distinct archetypical national systems and equilibria.
This Article offers a novel empirical comparison of patent
propensity rates among countries between 1996 and 2011. This
Article aggregates an advanced variation of patent propensity
analysis of both Emerging Economies and Advanced Economies as
a proxy for their non-linear, and thus separate, innovation-based
economic growth equilibria.
The model offered by this Article corroborates related earlier
findings whereby countries converge to multiple innovation-based
growth equilibria rather than to a single "one size fits all" theory in
their propensity to patent. A second finding offered by the model
confirms that Emerging Economies indeed are slowly, yet steadily,
converging towards advanced countries in their propensity to
patent. A full empirical account of the nooks and crannies of these
phenomena should be completed in following research. A
complete empirical account ultimately should lead to a novel non-
linear innovation theory accompanied by policy recommendations
that would work together to adapt present-day international
intellectual property instruments.
II. PATENTING IN ECONOMIC GROWTH THEORY
A. Patenting and Innovation-Based Economic Growth
The effects of patents on innovation-led economic growth are
unclear for two reasons. These two reasons relate to both the
ambiguous impact of patent laws alongside patenting itself on
economic growth. First, with respect to patent laws, much
empirical ambiguity remains concerning their impact on the
incentive to invest in research and development, their ability to
increase quotas of foreign direct investment ("FDI"), or their
ability to promote other forms of technology absorption and
5 NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION: TOWARD A THEORY OF INNOVATION
AND INTERACTIVE LEARNING, supra note 4; Freeman, supra note 4.
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diffusion in different countries.' If anything, intellectual property
rights ("IPRs") and patent law mostly seem to have failed in
predicting economic growth across countries.'
The second reason that has resulted in uncertainty of the effect
of patents on economic growth and the focal point of this Article
follows. It relates to the effect of patenting itself compared across
countries through patent propensity rates as a proxy for domestic
innovation and related economic growth.'
6 The scope of present empirical ambiguity is rather startling. See Jos6 L.
Groizard, Technology Trade, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 1526, 11-13 (2009) (using panel
data of eighty countries for the period 1970 finding that FDI is higher for
countries with stronger IPRs). On the other hand, Groizard found that a
negative relationship exists between IPRs and human capital indicators. Id.
Earlier findings are similarly ambiguous. While some researchers generally find
that protection of IPRs positively affects technological innovation, others
explain that lower IPRs can facilitate imitation, while on the other hand,
innovation in developing countries increases in proportion to greater IPR
protection. See, e.g., Sunil Kanwar & Robert Evenson, Does Intellectual
Property Protection Spur Technological Change?, 55 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS
235, 236 (2003), But see Yongmin Chen & Thitima Puttitanun, Intellectual
Property Rights and Innovation in Developing Countries, 78 J. DEv. ECON. 474,
489 (2005). Furthermore, Rod Falvey, David Greenaway, and Zhihong Yu
found evidence of a positive effect between IPR and economic growth for both
low and high-income countries, but not for middle-income countries. Extending
the Melitz Model to Asymmetric Countries (U. Nottingham Res. Paper Series,
Research Paper 2006/07) (using panel data of seventy-nine countries and four
sub-periods: 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, and 1990-1994). The
positive relationship between IPR and economic growth in low-income
countries cannot be explained by the potential fostering of R&D and innovation,
but by the idea that stronger IPR protection promotes imports and inner foreign
direct investment ("FDI") from high-income countries without negatively
affecting the national industry based on imitation. Id.
7 See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129-50 (vol. 12, 2002) ("At different times and in
different regions of the world, countries have realized high rates of growth under
varying degrees of IPRs protection."). See generally Walter G. Park & Juan
Carlos Ginarte, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 15
CONTEMP. EcON. POL'Y 51 (1997) (analyzing the relationship between
intellectual property rights and economic growth for a cross-section of countries
for the period 1960-1990).
8 The Article focuses solely on the propensity to patent in the backdrop of
other intellectual property regimes, which foster innovation, notably in
54 [VOL. 15: 49
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The central argument concerning economic growth across
countries through innovation emerged from Cambridge University
economist Nicholas Kaldor in 1957. Kaldor theorized differences
in development stages across countries could be explained by
differing rates in the adoption of technology.' The adoption of
technology is often measured through patent statistics. 0  The
underlying idea was that investment and learning were related and
that the rate at which they took place determined technological
progress." Years later, this standpoint was rather inaccurately
adopted by the United Nations towards developing countries. 2
The UN thought that there was a need for investing in research and
development ("R&D") by Multi-National Corporations ("MNCs")
to orient the direction of technological change. In order for this to
developing countries. But see, e.g., EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUJB &
STEPHANIE DIEPEVEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 19 (2010) ("Several surveys carried
out in developed countries have shown that other factors are much more
effective than patents in enabling firms to profit from inventive efforts: trade
secrecy, first-mover advantages and associated brand loyalty, the complexity of
the learning curve and establishment of effective production, sales and
marketing functions.") (internal citations omitted).
9 Nicholas Kaldor, A Model of Economic Growth, 67 ECON. J. 591, 595
(1957).
10 Stanford University Professors Charles Jones and Paul Romer recently
exemplified the usage of patent statistics over Kaldor's growth theory. See
Charles I. Jones & Paul M. Romer, The New Kaldor Facts: Ideas, Institutions,
Population, and Human Capital 8 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15094, 2009) (offering cross-country patent statistics for measuring
international flows of ideas alongside trade and FDI as key facets for economic
growth).
11 Kaldor, supra note 9.
12 See generally CALESTOUS JUMA & LEE YEE-CHEONG, UNITED NATIONS
MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INNOVATION: APPLYING KNOWLEDGE IN DEVELOPMENT
(2005); COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, OUR COMMON INTEREST: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (2005) (emphasizing the role of innovation and
underlying investment needs as a basis for economic transformation). For
additional literary critique on innovation policy for developing countries, see
generally ANDREANNE LIGER & SUSHMITA SWAMINATHAN, INNOVATION
THEORIES: RELEVANCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRY
INNOVATION at 4-12 (Ger. Inst. for Econ. Research, Discussion Papers 743,
2007).
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be effective, the UN should have recognized that such activity
should be backed by a comparatively narrower form of
independent technological learning by underdeveloped countries
themselves."
The internationalization of R&D by MNCs dramatically
impacts economic development worldwide. 4  It is thus not
surprising either that there is a large number of scientific studies on
this occurrence, or that several of these studies show an increasing
internationalization of innovative activity (mainly R&D) by
MNCs."
The growing emphasis on the internationalization of R&D by
both growth theoreticians and succeeding policy makers, largely
echoed another imperative theoretical breakthrough: Paul Romer's
endogenous growth theory in 1990.16 Romer found that economic
13 JUMA & YEE-CHEONG, supra note 12; COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, supra note
12. For an equivalent standpoint set by the World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO"), see WIPO, THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES iN TRANSITION 22 (2009) (R&D is the most
important economic indicator on how effective the innovation process is).
14 Frieder Meyer-Krahmer & Guido Reger, New Perspectives on the
Innovation Strategies of Multinational Enterprises: Lessons for Technology
Policy in Europe, 28 RES. POL'Y 751, 752 (1999).
15 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPENDIUM OF
PATENT STATISTICS (2008); Daniele Archibugi & Alberto Coco, The
Globalization of Technology and the European Innovation System, in
KNOWLEDGE, COMPLEXITY AND INNOVATION SYSTEMS 58 (Manfred M. Fischer,
Josef Frbhlich, eds.) (2001); Pari Patel & Modesto Vega, Patterns of
Internationalization of Corporate Technology: Location vs. Home Country
Advantages, 28 RES. POL'Y 145 (1999); Alexander Gerybadze & Guido Reger,
Globalization of R&D: Recent Changes in the Management of Innovation in
Transnational Corporations, 28 RES. POL'Y 251 (1999); Pari Patel, Localised
Production of Technology for Global Markets, 19 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 141
(1995) (offering evidence that there is no systematic evidence to suggest that
widespread globalization of technological activities occurred in the 1980s).
16 See Paul M. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, 8 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 4-10 (1994); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98
J. POL. ECON. S71, S72 (1990) ("Technological change provides the incentive
for continued capital accumulation, and together, capital accumulation and
technological change account for much of the increase in output per hour
worked.").
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growth is primarily the result of endogenous investments in
industrial research (and development) in innovation by forward-
looking, profit-seeking agents. 7  In marked contrast to the
neoclassical growth models formulated earlier by Robert Solow'"
followed by that of David Cassl9 and Tjalling Koopmans,20 where
long-run economic growth depends on an archetypical exogenous
process being a by-product of investment in machinery and
equipment-Romer's hallmark economic growth insight
seemingly prevailed.2' Albeit criticized by competing economic
models for possible inaccuracies within United States patent-based
innovative markets, Romer's model survived and ultimately lays
the foundations to R&D-related growth altogether.2 2 Henceforth,
17 Id.
18 Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory ofEconomic Growth, 70 Q.
J. EcON. 65, 68-73 (1956).
19 David Cass, Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital
Accumulation, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 233, 233-40 (1965).
20 Tjalling Koopmans, On the concept of optimal economic growth, in (STUDY
WEEK ON THE) ECONOMETRIC APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, at 226-
28 (1965).
21 Romer's economic growth theory was also said to result from investment in
human capital and knowledge. Romer's insight soon after became widely
popular. See Ben Fine, Endogenous Growth Theory: A Critical Assessment, 24
CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 245, 246 (2000) ("Over the past three years, the number of
articles explicitly drawing upon [Romer's] endogenous growth theory almost
certainly borders on a thousand.").
22 The contributions by economists Aghion and Howitt and Grossman and
Helpman were particularly effective in utilizing the increasing returns to scale of
innovations to explain persistent global growth of output per capita over the
recent two centuries. See Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, A Model of Growth
Through Creative Destruction, 60(2) ECONOMETRICA 323, 327-29 (1992);
GENE GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-6 (1991). For critics of Romer's endogenous growth
model, see Paul Segerstrom, Endogenous Growth Without Scale Effects,
88(5) AM. ECON. REV. 1290, 1292-95 (1998) (arguing that data does not
support the claim that the rate of growth increases with the scale of the economy
because patent statistics have been roughly constant even though R&D
employment as an endogenous growth indication has risen sharply between the
1970s-2000s and because a steady increase in R&D efforts has not led to any
upward trend in U.S. economic growth rates); Charles Jones, Time Series Tests
of Endogenous Growth Models, 110(2) Q. J. ECON. 495, 501-02 (1995)
(developing an alternative model explaining why economic growth has not
OCT. 2013] 57
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technological change, particularly through research (and
development) expenditures, is sine qua non as it lies at the heart of
economic growth theory.23 The empirics of patent propensity rates
across countries analyzed in this Article thus flow naturally from
the central role given to the measurement of R&D in relation with
patenting itself.
Growth theory traditionally has gone through another
innovation-related growth transformation. Until the recent
expansion of exogenous growth theory, policy makers adhered
implicitly to innovation-based economic growth as a linear process
of technological development or innovation.24 The model
of innovation classifies research activities and establishes a
connection between basic and applied research and eventually
commercial activities.25 It was perceived that "[d]eveloping
countries were deemed to be at an earlier stage than the more
advanced economies along the linear path of historical [economic]
progress."26 Such archetypical linearity was said to equally foster
accelerated in spite of substantial increase in R&D efforts).
23 Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, supra note 16, at S72.
24 See STEPS CENTRE, supra note 2; Data and Statistics, INT'L MONETARY
FUND (2012), http://www.imf.org/extemal/data.htm. See generally UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT (2005) (analyzing ways to close the archetypical 'Technology gap'
between countries with respect to innovation). In reference to the role of
internationalization of R&D in closing the 'Technology gap' the report further
reads: "Large gaps [in this area] prevail between countries-gaps that limit the
ability of many of them to take part in the global networks of knowledge
creation and diffusion. Addressing these gaps is a major development challenge;
it is also essential to ensure that the internationalization of R&D by TNCs
benefits larger parts of the world." Id. at 100. For a historical account of the
linear theory of innovation, see Godin, supra note 2, at 639-41 (adding that
historically the linear model is not an actual scientific model of innovation or
intellectual progress but rather a variety of actors such as scientists seeking
funding and economists advising government agencies, which have constructed
the linear model of innovation to classify research activities and to establish a
connection between basic and applied research and eventually commercial
activities).
25 See Godin, supra note 2, at 639, 657.
26 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., supra note 3, at 40 (for a broader
contextual discussion). See generally Rostow, supra note 3, at 4 (offering a
limited production function for growth whereas "It is possible to identify all
[VOL. 15: 4958
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growth across countries by means of translation of R&D supply
into "better" innovations based on a single economic equilibrium.
The linear theory indicated that technology is most efficiently
acquired through assimilation of the existing backlog of knowledge
by developing countries through investment in R&D-enhancing
policies. Studying international aspects of the process of economic
growth through innovation and learning, Harvard University
economist Alexander Gerschenkon in 1962 offered a pioneering
idea which was called into action. As Gerschenkon explained,
"technology gaps" between technologically edged economies by
mostly developed economies and laggard developing countries
provide developing countries immense opportunities for economic
growth.2 7 It was not until the late 1970s that the technology gap
standpoint was revived, leading to the so-called "technology gap"
theory within modern innovation theory literature. In this later
intellectual stage, the literature widely explored the catching-up
process by lagging countries.2 8 Yet, as Carolta Perez and L. Soete
remarked, 29 catching-up was- again perceived linearly to be a
"question of relative speed in a race along a fixed track,"o where
technology was perceived as a "cumulative unidirectional
process."'
societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories:
the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to
maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption"); Gerschenkon, supra note 3
(introducing his theory of "Economics Backwardness"-a country undergoing
industrialization will have a different experience depending on its degree of
economics backwardness when industrialization begins-as a reaction to
uniform stages theories such as Rostow's).
27 See Gerschenkon, supra note 3.
28 See JOHN CORNWALL, MODERN CAPITALISM: ITS GROWTH AND
TRANSFORMATION (1977); Moses Abramovitz, Rapid Growth Potential and its
Realization: the Experience of Capitalist Economics in the Postwar Period, in 1
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND RESOURCES 191 (E. Malinvaud ed., 1979).
29 See Carlota Perez & L. Luc Soete, Catching-Up in Technology: Entry
Barriers and Windows of Opportunity, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 458 (G. Dosi, ed., 1988).
30 Id. at 460.
' Id.
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The idea of linear-or equal country treating-economic
growth through technology continually prevailed riding a
mounting gale of equal country policy recommendations. The
original Sussex Manifesto,32 most notably, alongside many
research contributions originated by scholars also from developing
countries, led to a stream of problematic policy recommendations.
The recommendations were naturally directed at closing the
widening technology gap by promoting scientific and
technological outputs while reemphasizing the weight of scientific
R&D." The policy recommendations further called for the
adoption of technical manpower, incentivizing scientific
publications, and the promotion of patenting of state-of-the-art
technology per se, as proxy for innovation itself.3 4 So much so,
that until this day, most of what is typically labeled in international
intellectual property law as "innovation policy" continues to focus
on improving R&D intensity as the chief growth related indicator.
This innovation policy is moderately based on Romer's
endogenous growth theory while implicitly adhering to a linear
growth model for all countries.
B. OfPatenting as Linear Innovation
Numerous international intellectual property instruments
emphasizing patent-related policies adhere to the idea of linear
innovation. These models draw a parallel to the creation of the
United Nations' innovation policy-related organs, notably the
WTO's signing of the TRIPS Agreement and the innovation-
related policy by the WHO. It similarly draws parallel to the
recent policy initiatives by the WIPO, and more broadly the
Washington Consensus' macroeconomic reform package promoted
32 See generally HANS WOLFGANG SINGER, The Sussex Manifesto: Science
and Technology for Developing Countries during the Second Development
Decade, in I.D.S. REPRINTS NO. 101, (Institute of Development Studies 1974)
(1970).
3 See GREGORY TASSEY, THE ECONOMICS OF R&D POLICY 54-55, 226
(1997); see generally Patel, supra note 15; Jeffrey L. Furman, Michael E. Porter
& Scott Stem, The Determinants of National Innovative Capacity, 31 RES.
POL'Y 899, 900 (2002).
34 See Tassey, supra note 33.
[VOL. 15: 4960
International Patent Propensity Divide
for crisis-wracked developing countries by the IMF, World Bank,
and the United States Treasury Department, as will be discussed
herein.
UN organs and WIPO and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") have systematically fallen
short in devoting substantial attention to innovation-policy
differences between developing and developed countries, before
the establishment of the WTO and TRIPS." It was, therefore, only
natural that upon its adoption, the TRIPS Agreement merely
consisted of a flat intellectual property policy for all
WTO-members, corresponding with a neoclassical economic
growth modeling.36
In essence, from the standpoint of developing countries,
mandatory adoption of TRIPS standards created two related
exogenous costs towards the developed world: the cost of reduced
access to new technologies and knowledge and the cost of higher
Particularly, the failing New International Economic Order was a set of
proposals put forward during the 1970s by numerous developing countries
through UNCTAD to promote their interests by improving their terms of trade
based on technology transfer (per technological goods) mostly. The term was
derived from the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, and
referred to a wide range of trade, financial, commodity, and debt-related issues.
See Resolution, U.N. General Assembly, Declaration for the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201 (1974).
For theoretical and empirical studies, see generally Helge E. Grundmann,
Foreign Patent Monopolies in Developing Countries: An Empirical Analysis, 12
J. DEV. STUD. 186 (1976); J. Katz, Patents, The Paris Convention and Less
Developed Countries 24-27 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Center, Discussion Paper
No. 190, 1973); Douglas F. Greer, The Case Against Patent Systems in Less-
Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 223, 225 (1973). UNCTAD has
changed course afterwards. See infra n. 154-56 and accompanying text.
36 See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property
Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 265, 278 (2010);
MICHAEL BLAKENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY: FROM THE PARIS CONVENTION TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 16
(2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/arab/en/meetings/
2003/ipcai 1/pdf/wipoipcai _03_2.pdf.
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royalty payments." Against that backdrop, TRIPS held up
international intellectual property protection as a central pillar for
both short and long-run economic growth, effectively ignoring
country group differences. This argument stood for two long-run
neoclassic exogenous economic incentives offered by developed
nations." The first incentive promised to undertake positive efforts
in the area of technology transfer-it being an archetypical form of
a reflexive innovation policy towards the developing countries as
the transferees.39 The second incentive assured agricultural trade.40
These incentives, backed by supportive agreements, were pivotal
for the final acquiescence of developing countries to the TRIPS
agreement.4' Both incentives also implicitly adhered to Solow's
neoclassical growth model, formulated earlier by economists
n See Christopher S. Gibson, Globalization and the Technology Standards
Game: Balancing Concerns of Protectionism and Intellectual Property in
International Standards, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1403, 1406 (2007).
38 See, e.g., Carolyn Deere, Developing Countries in the Global IP System, in
THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 34,
51 (2009); Peter Yu, Towards a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 635
(2001). Cf Christine Thelen, Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Tools for
Securing Successful TRIPs Implementation, XXIV TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. &
ENVTL. L. 519, 528-33 (2006) (discussing four incentive mechanisms tailored
for developing countries within TRIPS, namely creating short and long-term
economic growth, technical assistance and additional time to become
compliant).
39 See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 2 (2004); CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE
WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY
OPTIONs 18 (2000) (focusing on developing country's concern for increasing
technological transfer as means of economic growth). For broader long-run
economic growth concerns by developing countries, see also Thelen, supra note
38, at 528-29.
40 See Helfer, supra note 39, at 22; Clete D. Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the
Developing World? Presidential "Trade Promotion Authority" and the
Unfulfilled Promise of Agriculture Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 464-65 (2004).
41 Johnson, supra note 40, at 467-68.
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David Cass,42 and Tjalling Koopmans, as explained.43 Neither the
incentives nor the TRIPS Agreement at large incorporated
substantive efforts to differentiate between country clusters nor
otherwise consider a non linear underlying innovation theory.
Notwithstanding its deep-rooted innovation implications,
TRIPS was predominantly accepted as a trade-related
compromise." Rooted in dependency theories of development
whereby developing countries were flatly perceived to be
dependent on developed ones, freer trade was said to immiserate
countries of the "periphery."4 5 TRIPS' trade-related stand may
further have explained its exogenous economic stand all together.
The acceptance of TRIPS reflected the unequal, yet flat,
bargaining power between developed and the group of developing
countries in its entirety. The bargaining between developed and
developing countries permitted developed countries to receive
stronger protection for intellectual property rights as well as a
42 Cass, supra note 19.
43 Koopmans, supra note 20, at 226-28.
44 See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2001) (explaining how developed countries
agreed to phase out their quotas under the ATC (Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing) on the most sensitive items of textiles and clothing in exchange for
developing countries' acceptance to the phasing-in of product patents for
pharmaceuticals which they perceived as the most important patent-related
good). See also Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL
INTEGRATION 39, 39-40 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997);
Deere, supra note 38, at 2; Charles S. Levy, Implementing TRIPS-A Test
ofPolitical Will, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 789, 789-90 (2000) (describing
TRIPS as a historical breakthrough even whereby minimal standards alone were
set for international property rights concerning international trade).
45 See, e.g., Raul Prebisch, International Trade and Payments in an Era of
Coexistence: Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, 49 AM.
ECON. REv. 251, 251-52 (1959) (offering examples of reasoning used by
developing "periphery" countries fostering an aversion to increasing free trade).
For a seminal Latin-American perspective, see FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO
& ENZo FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 149-71
(Marjory Mattingly Uriquidi trans., University of California Press 1979)
(depicting the tension between Latin American nationalist and populist political
agendas and its impact on related international trade policies).
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reduction in restrictions against foreign direct investment.46 Less
developed countries, in return, obtained lower tariffs on textiles
and agriculture and protection against unilateral sanctions.47
In short, given its unique mixture of exogenous economical
trade rules and fairly flat international intellectual property
concepts, TRIPS never adhered to an endogenous economic
growth model. TRIPS did not adhere to any particular innovation
policy, but did adhere to one that was implicitly linear.
This rather implicit linear innovation inclination eluded
developed countries and also developing countries. The
developing countries instead mostly adhered to "inherent
asymmetries and imbalances" as a trading constraint. That is,
within the WTO's trading system and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, including TRIPS, such a confrontational approach
was almost certainly constituted at the Fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference at Doha Qatar in 2001.48 History, henceforth, recalls
the resilient standoff by the Group of 77 and China per trading
issues thereof.49 Doha, nonetheless, should also be recalled as their
reactive innovation policy slip.
The TRIPS Agreement (a neoclassical economic growth
modeling corresponding with an implicit linear "one size fits all"
international intellectual property approach) adds two particularly
narrow exceptions as described in Table 1 (See below). Article 65
of the TRIPS Agreement provides less developed and transitional
46 See Watal, supra note 44, at 20; see also Abbott, supra note 44, at 39-40,
42.
47 See Watal, supra note 44, at 20-22 (describing the sanctions imposed until
the broad inauguration of the TRIPS agreement by the United States and other
developed countries via the mandatory settlement process).
48 See World Trade Organization, Declaration of the Group of 77 and China
on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, WT/L/424 (Oct. 22,
2001), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/
proposalse/wt_1_424.pdf.
49 See Inge Govaere & Paul Demaret, The TRIPS Agreement: A Response to
Global Regulatory Competition or an Exercise in Global Regulatory Coercion?,
in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 364, 368-69 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
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countries with a five-year transitional period."o Article 66 more
notably provides least developed countries ("LDCs") with an
eleven-year transitional period." Such pretentious egalitarian
dialectic was seen, however, merely as a means to create "a sound
and viable technological base" in these countries.5 2 Article 66 thus
limits taking-only technological transfer, in favor of a disputed
dependency development theory." Surely, both the Less-
Developing Countries cluster and the Emerging Economies were
ignored. Instead, an implied linear innovation theory presided.
Table 1: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, 1994 (TRIPS) Patent-Related Policy
Developing Developed
Countries (162) Countries (32)
Least Developing Less-Developing Emerging
Countries (LDCs) Countries Economies (24)
(TRIPS & IMF/WB) (IMF/WB) (IMF/WB)
_ _ _ 1[ I
Angola Ecuador China
DR Congo Columbia India
Nigeria Russian Federation
Egypt Brazil
Azerbaijian South Africa
An examination of the actions of WHO offers an analogous
following innovation policy blunder; In particular, the reliance on
R&D as a motor of innovation of pharmaceuticals. In an
analogous manner to the bargaining situation assumed by the UN
5o Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
65(1)-(3), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (Apr. 15, 1994), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/27-trips.pdf.
51 Id. at art. 66(1); Benoliel & Salama, supra note 36, at 360.
52 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 50, art. 66(2) (requiring developed countries to provide commercial
incentives to encourage transfer of technology to least developed countries).
5 id.
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in creating TRIPS, WHO similarly failed to adhere to a separate
innovation policy given the underdeveloped world's fairly
puzzling innovation activity characteristics.5 4 For example, as of
May 24, 2008, the World Health Assembly ("WHA"), the
decision-making body for the WHO, released a document entitled
"Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation
and Intellectual Property."" In the report, WHO Member States
suggest implementing strategies to promote R&D for diseases
endemic in developing countries." An Intergovernmental Working
Group ("IGWG") consisting of representatives from over twenty
countries developed these strategies." One stated aim of the action
plan was to "explor[e] a range of incentive mechanisms . . . [and]
address[] the de-linkage of the costs of research and development
and the price of health products and methods."" Some of the
proposed strategies include open source research, patent pools, and
prizes." Yet rather unsurprisingly, soon after, on January 21,
2009, the WHO released a policy document entitled "Proposed
Time Frames and Estimated Funding Needs" to implement the
WHO IGWG plan of action.o The total cost estimate to implement
the WHO IGWG plan of action was said to be $2.064 billion
dollars, with a proposed time frame from 2009 to 2015.61 Similarly
to TRIPS, however, TRIPS' implementation again assumed the
54 Sixty-First World Health Assembly [hereinafter WHA], World Health
Organization [hereinafter WHO], Global strategy and plan of action on public
health, innovation and intellectual property, at 1, WHA61.21, (May 24, 2008),
available at http://www.who.'int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf;
Exec. Bd. 124th Session, WHO, Public health, innovation and intellectual
property: global strategy and plan of action: Proposed time frames and
estimated funding needs, at 1, EB124/16 Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/EBl24/Bl24_16Add2-en.pdf.
5s WHO Exec. Bd., supra note 54; 2008 WHA Report, supra note 54.
56 WHO, supra note 54, at 1, 6.
5 See WHO, Public health, innovation and intellectual property and trade;
Expert Working Group on R&D Financing, http://www.who.int/phi/
RDfinancing/en (last visited September 22, 2013) [hereinafter Expert Working
Group].
ss 2008 WHA Report, supra note 54, at 5.
" Id. at 10, 14, 16-17.
60 Exec. Bd. 124th Session, supra note 54, at 1.
61 Id. at 1-2.
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rather unattainable internationalized MNC-led R&D activity. That
is, the plan adopted a flat intellectual property policy, with no
adherence to the rather dreary innovation conditions in distinct
developing countries and possibly developing country clusters.6 2
A third United Nations organ to manifest an implicit linear, and
thus flat, innovation policy towards both developing and developed
countries is assumed by WIPO. Throughout the 1990s, WIPO's
Secretariat was sympathetic to policy goals promoting developing
countries. Yet, as Professor Laurence Helfer foretold, this early
witnessed inclination shifted to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade's ("GATT") market power-based policies. With the
establishment of the WTO, this shift finally formalized to the
benefit of intellectual property-based industries in the developed
world, including public health, biosciences, and the genetic
industrial sectors.63  To date, WIPO interprets its legislative
mandate as one of progressively promoting intellectual property
rights, again, flatly. It does so while admitting, however, that little
is known about how innovation takes place in lesser developed
economies and what incentivizes it.64 This attitude is exemplified
in the organization's flat promotion of recent agreements on the
electronic transmission of works protected by copyrights or related
rights,65 and in its ongoing negotiations concerning the
harmonization of patent rights. 66 As Professors Keith Maskus and
62 See generally 2008 WHA Report, supra note 54, at 1; WHO Exec. Bd.,
supra note 54, at 1-2.
63 See Helfer, supra note 39, at 3-4.
6 WIPO Economics & Statistics Series, World Intellectual Property Report-
The Changing Face of Innovation 26 (2001). For a critique of the Secretariat's
interpretation of WIPO's mandate see Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman,
The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global
Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 279, 294 n.54 (2004) (citations omitted).
65 See generally WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94 (23 December 1996), WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95 (23
December 1996), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/
summary wct.html (noting that not even the TRIPS Agreement equivalent
extensions for less developing countries are to be found at the Copyright Treaty
of 1996).
66 See generally WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Tenth
Session, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, SCP/10/2, available at
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Jerome Reichman conclude, whether WIPO's strategy actually
benefits innovation (and to which countries those benefits flow)
seems to count for little in implementing the mandate.6 7
Lastly, archetypical linear innovation-based economic growth
policies ultimately were incorporated, albeit implicitly, into a
wider macroeconomic setting. The IMF, the World Bank, and the
United States Treasury Department created a standard
macroeconomic reform package promoted for crisis-
wracked developing countries. Economist John Williamson coined
them jointly as the Washington Consensus.6 8 For developing
countries these policies encompassed standard "package deal"
policies in areas like macroeconomic stabilization, economic
opening with respect to both trade and R&D investment, and the
expansion of market forces within the domestic economy. 69 As
seminal as the Washington Consensus became, its neoclassical
economic and protectionist approach towards innovation policy
remained mostly uncorroborated. In retrospect, Joseph Stiglitz and
others criticizing the policies' protectionist approach blamed
Washington D.C. for stifling innovation or otherwise not
foreseeing the policies' potential growth impact on developing
countries."o
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_10/scp_10 2.pdf. For general
background about the WIPO, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents can be
found at http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/scp.htm.
67 See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 64, at 294.
68 John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN
AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7 (John Williamson,
ed. 1990). See generally Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello
Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's "Economic Growth in
the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform", 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973
(2006).
69 See generally Williamson, supra note 68.
70 See, e.g., Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist, World Bank, More Instruments
and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus, address
at the 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture 17 (Jan. 7, 1998) (transcript available at
http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/washingtonconsensus/instrumentsbroadergoals.
pdf) ("The usual argument-that protectionism itself stifled innovation-was
somewhat confused. Governments could have created competition among
domestic firms, which would have provided incentives to import new
technology."); see also Wing Thye Woo, Some Fundamental Inadequacies of
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Even to date no empirical findings strictly correlate the
ultimate demise of Washington's growth policies with innovation-
led economic growth or theoretical variances thereof. It is
nonetheless disappointing that in the past fifty-seven years only six
economies-Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Malta, Singapore,
and Taiwan, China-have made the growth transition from
developing to developed economies notwithstanding their
innovation policy stance.n Another elegy of this overly broad
"catch up" growth narration-again largely non indicative of linear
innovation policies per se-is evident through examination of
developing countries that have had at least twenty-seven years of
consecutive growth above seven percent since 1950. The World
Bank's Growth Commission Report of 2008 found only thirteen
economies that had achieved such high rates of growth.72
While subjecting the World Bank's ubiquitous invocation of
rule of law-related policies to the trenchant critique of the
Washington Consensus, scholars like Portuguese economist Alvaro
Santos offered a distinct break in the World Bank's much criticized
policy. He and others labeled it as a post-Washington Consensus
the Washington Consensus: Misunderstanding the Poor by the Brightest, at 1
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=622322 ("The
Washington Consensus is too hooked upon trade-led growth to acknowledge
that science-led growth is becoming even more important.").
71 See World Bank, Innovation Policy: A Guide for Developing Countries
(2010), at 43, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/i 0986/2460/548930PUB0EPIl l C1ODislosed061312010.pdf?sequence=
1; see also World Bank Comm'n on Growth & Dev., The Growth Report
Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Development (2008), at 111,
available at http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/forms/growthReport.pdf (adding
that the 10 largest developing countries "account for about 70 percent of
developing countries' GDP," that industrialized countries' secular growth rate is
approximately 2 percent per capita, and that "[slince 1960, only 6 countries have
grown faster than 3 percent in per capita terms .... ).
72 The list of thirteen includes the six countries mentioned above that became
developed countries-Hong Kong, China, Japan, Korea, Malta, Singapore, and
Taiwan, China-plus seven others that are still developing: Botswana, Brazil,
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, and Thailand. Except for Botswana and
China, these nations have not sustained their rate of growth, thereby preventing
these other developing countries from making the transition into developed
ones. See World Bank, supra note 71.
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development model thus marking the "fall of neoliberal
thinking."7
C. Towards Non Linear Innovation Patenting
The height of the demise of the Washington Consensus by the
mid-1990s came late in comparison with late 1970s key innovation
theoretical findings.74 By the mid-1990s economists such as David
Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg had already predicted for over a
decade the death of the neoclassical linear-model of innovation
causality in technology and science or markets.7 ' As Mowery and
Rosenberg further explained in their 1991 Cambridge University
Press monograph titled "Technology and the Pursuit of Economic
Growth," the contributions of economics to the understanding of
technology and economic growth have been constrained by the
theoretical framework employed within neoclassical economies.
Innovation causation was to be replaced with the recognition that
7 Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Uses of the "Rule of Law" Promise in
Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 267 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
Neoliberalism surely incorporates free markets, the liberalization of trade and
finance, and a limited role for the state in the economic and social organization
of society. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 2-4
(2005); see also HA-JOON CHANG, GLOBALIZATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 47-50 (2003).
74 See, e.g., John Weeks & Howard Stein, Washington Consensus, in THE
ELGAR COMPANION TO DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 676, 676 (David Alexander
Clark ed., 2006) ("The Consensus reigned hegemonic in international
development policy from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, when it came under
sustained attack.").
7 See, e.g., David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, The Influence Of Market
Demand Upon Innovation: A Critical Review of Some Recent Empirical Studies,
8 RES. POL. 102, 103 (1979) (criticizing the imbalanced attention given to
demand-side innovation policy considerations, the authors state, "Little
consideration has been paid to the study, at a less aggregated level, of the
specific innovative outputs of industries and firms, and the forces explaining
differences among industries, firms and nations.").
76 See DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (1991) ("The neoclassical economic
framework for the analysis of R&D and innovation says very little if anything
about the institutional structure of the research systems of advanced industrial
economies . . . ."); see also id. at 16, 96 (providing similar conclusion).
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innovation-being endogenous and non linear-involved a
complex and country specific mix of new knowledge and new
demand, with the exact blend being technology, firm and time
specific.n
The studies, especially the abovementioned Science Policy
Research Unit's, were primarily concerned with determinants of
success and failure in industrial innovation. These studies,
therefore, were far less concerned with the determinants of the rate
and direction of the innovative activity per se."
A novel critique has originated from evolutionary economics
and presently represents a departure from earlier neoclassical
theories and assumptions.7 9 The theory is based on the
Schumpeterian vision of the economic world as a chain of
disequilibria, plainly dynamic and evolutionary, but which regards
invention as an endogenous process rather than an exogenous force
acting on the economic scheme. As its two early advocates,
Sidney Winter and Richard Nelson, theorized in their 1982 book
titled "An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change," critique
over neoclassical economics linear growth causality over
innovation justified an adapted new setting for innovation theory.so
n See generally GERHARD MENSCH, STALEMATE IN TECHNOLOGY:
INNOVATIONS OVERCOME THE DEPRESSION (1979) (criticizing linear innovation
using the example of computers in the United Kingdom during the sixties while
arguing linear representations of innovation processes thereof are poorly
explained linearly); SCI. POL'Y RESEARCH UNIT, REPORT ON PROJECT SAPPHO
1971 (detailing a study of management of innovation in two science-based
industries, chemicals and scientific instruments, identifying the factors which
distinguish innovations that achieved commercial success). But see Slavo
Radosevic and Esin Yoruk, SAPPHO Revisited: Factors of Innovation Success
in Knowledge-Intensive Enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe, (DRUID
Working Paper No. 12-11), available at http://www3.druid.dk/wp/2012001 1.
pdf.
78 The last straw for the linear model was its inability to explain how Japan
could be so successful with technology despite lacking a world-class science
base as opposed to British firms. See generally Dianna Hicks, T. Ishizuka, & S.
Sweet, Japanese Corporations, Scientific Research and Globalization, 23 RES.
POL'Y 4 (1994) (rejecting that Japanese companies are "free riders" on world
science as their science draws most heavily on Japanese, not foreign sources).
79 See Leger & Swaminathan, supra note 12.
80 For a critique of neoclassical growth theory for being overly generalized as
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Evolutionary economics models incorporated an interactive effect
between variables, as opposed to the impact that any single
variable might have, in explaining the process of innovation and
diffusion. Arguably, the models may ultimately withstand the
dynamic impact of innovation country clusters as opposed to a
single or linear innovation model.
Notably, the United States government much later also
admitted in its 2008 United States President's Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology ("PCAST") report that there has been
a growing need for a non or at least less-linear innovation theory
and policy as a whole."' Recently, such findings have been evenly
witnessed' throughout the ever-growing literature on non-linear
innovation causation within developing countries' scholarship.8 2
Following on the tails of non-linear innovation analysis, one
distinct theory has started to transform into policy within the
said, see generally Ricardo Hausmann, Dani Rodrik & Andrds Velasco, Getting
the Diagnosis Right: A New Approach to Economic Reform, 43 FIN. & DEV. 12
(2006); Ricardo Hausman, Dani Rodrik & Andrds Velasco, Growth Diagnostics,
in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE (Narcis Serra & Joseph Stiglitz eds., 2008); Dani Rodrik, The
New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, But How Shall We
Learn? 24-28 (Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government
Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Paper No. RWPO8-055, 2008) (stating
that new development economics have become country-specific).
81 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
UNIVERSITY-PRIVATE SECTOR RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INNOVATION
ECOSYSTEM 1-2, 7, 31 (2008) (acknowledging the shift from a linear
innovation paradigm into a non-linear, or less linear one).
82 See, e.g., N.C. Varsakelis, The Impact of Patent Protection, Economy
Openness and National Culture on R&D Investment: A Cross-Country
Empirical Investigation 30 RES. POL. 1059 (2001) (finding national culture to be
a determinant of R&D intensity, using a panel of developing and industrialized
countries); see generally Oscar Alfranca & Wallace E. Huffman, Aggregate
Private R&D Investments in Agriculture: The Role of Incentives, Public
Policies, and Institutions, 52 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 1-22 (2003)
(showing that private agricultural R&D investments in EU countries also
respond to the quality of the institutional environment, with an emphasis on
bureaucracy, enforcement of contracts and IP protection); UNESCO Institute for
Statistics, Measuring R&D: Challenges Faced by Developing Countries,
UIS/TD/10-08 (2008), available at http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/
Documents/tech%205-eng.pdf.
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OECD and the EU: "National Systems of Innovation" theory.13
This seminal theory explains how innovation and technology
development are the results of a complex set of domestic
relationships among various state institutions84  including
enterprises, universities, and government research institutes.
Developed by the renowned Danish economist Bengt-Ake
Lundvall, "National System of Innovation" was initially used by
the canonic Chris Freeman to explain the rise developing countries.
Freeman's initial case study focused on Japanese innovative firms
in the 1970s and 1980s when Japan was still a developing country.
As said, this theory soon gradually became a core policy concept
of OECD and EU. As an archetypical non-linear as well as
endogenous innovation-based economic growth theory it has
shifted focus to concentrating on the formal R&D system and
technical education thereof bearing a country-specific policy
orientation."
Substantive empirical corroboration of the non-linearity
between countries and group of countries, with emphasis on the
gap between advanced and developing countries could now be
achieved. Such reaching has been made possible particularly with
the completion of an unprecedented and monumental country panel
83 For major academic contributions, see generally LUNDVALL, supra note 4;
R. R. NELSON, NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS,
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1993); PATEL & PAVITT, supra note 4; Freeman, supra
note 4. For a general overview, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 3, at 57 (adding that the elements of the National Innovation System
theory ("NIS") have close similarities to structuralist views stressing that
"development is neither linear nor sequential, but a unique process shaped by a
specific histor[ical,]" cultural, and socioeconomic context).
84 See LUNDVALL, supra note 4 ( incorporating elements and relationships in
the national system of innovation, which interact in the production, diffusion
and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge).
85 The dramatic breakthrough for the theory was a three-year work program
known as the Technology-Economy Programme ("TEP") leading to the TEP
Report. The theory was later carried through also in subsequent OECD policy
studies, such as the 1994 Jobs Study and the policy recommendations, the 1996
Technology, Productivity and Job Creation report, and the 1998 Technology,
Productivity and Job Creation: Best Policy Practices. See LYNN K. MYTELKA &
KEITH SMITH, INNOVATION THEORY AND INNOVATION POLICY: BRIDGING THE
GAP 12-17 (2001).
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dataset by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization ("UNESCO") Institute for Statistics Monumental
Science and Technology ("S&T") in 2011. Developing countries
that previously have rarely reported on consolidated R&D growth
indicators and related S&T statistics systems have enormously
contributed towards a highly detailed standardized country panel
datasets. This means that the country panel datasets can be used
instead of previous lesser R&D-related datasets and/or lesser-
developed S&T national statistics systems."
III. THE MODEL
A. Overview
Developing countries led by Emerging Economies differ in
their propensity to attract FDI, trade, and technology." Arguably,
they also differ in their overall abilities to innovate and make use
of intellectual property protection. Surely, traditional approaches
typically depart from the well-known North/South dichotomy, or
some variation thereof." The differences in the economics of
developing countries highlight, in particular, innovation
asymmetries between Northern countries, which are deemed to
generate innovative products and technologies, and Southern
countries, which are generally deemed to consume them.89
Surprisingly, out of 162 developing countries twenty-five
account for about ninety percent of the Gross Domestic Product
("GDP") of the developing countries. All but one of these twenty-
five were emerging economies.o
IMF has recently labeled exactly twenty-four such countries as
"Emerging Economies."" These underdeveloped economies-and
86 See also UNESCO, supra note 82, at 12.
87See generally Benoliel & Salama, supra note 36, at 275-90 nn.25-90.
88 See Paul Krugman, A Model of Innovation, Technology Transfer, and the
World Distribution ofIncome, 87 J. POL. ECON. 253, 254-55 (1979).
89 See CORREA, supra note 39, at 11.
90 World Bank Comm'n on Growth & Dev., supra note 71 (adding that the ten
largest developing countries account for about 70 percent of developing
countries' GDP).
91 As of July 16, 2012 Emerging Economies include: Mexico, Argentina,
[VOL. 15: 4974
OCT. 2013] International Patent Propensity Divide 75
they alone-are presently perceived as hotbeds of meaningful
innovation within the developing world.9 2
Another comparable (albeit informal) country group
classification is the Newly Industrialized Countries ("NICs")
topping the list of developing countries by GDP.93 Essentially,
NICs differ from the remaining developing countries because they
possess large and relatively diversified domestic economies. This
fact awards them the status of being strategic and fast-growing
markets in and with which multinational corporations typically
cannot refrain from investing or trading.94 Consequently, NICs
Pakistan, Brazil, Peru, Bulgaria, Philippines, Chile, Poland, China, Romania,
Estonia, Russia, Hungary, South Africa, India, Thailand, Indonesia, Turkey,
Latvia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Venezuela, and Malaysia. See World Economic and
Financial Surveys, World Economic Outlook, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
(Apr. 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf.
92 Grace Segran, As innovation drives growth in emerging markets, western
economies need to adapt, INSEAD (Jan. 25, 2011), http://knowledge.insead.edu/
innovation-emerging-markets- 1101 12.cfmn?vid=515; see also SUBHASH
CHANDRA JAIN, EMERGING ECONOMIES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 46 (2006) (stating that considerable attention has
been devoted to the growing prominence of emerging nations in recent years and
projecting the emerging markets of Brazil, Russia, India, and China as potential
future leaders of the global economy). Similarly, in her book "The Rise of 'The
Rest' " Amsden identifies twelve countries that have acquired considerable
manufacturing experience: China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Malaysia,
Taiwan, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Turkey. See ALICE H.
AMSDEN, THE RISE OF "THE REST": CHALLENGES TO THE WEST FROM LATE-
INDUSTRIALIZING ECONOMIES 15 (2001).
93 For a comparable analysis of twenty-two Newly Industrialized Countries
(NICs), compare with ANIS CHOWDHURY & IYANATUL ISLAM, THE NEWLY
INDUSTRIALISING ECONOMIES OF EAST ASIA 4-5 (1997) (listing the twenty-two
countries categorized as NIEs and their respective GDP savings ratio, GNP per
capita, share of manufacturing percentage, and human development index as of
1988). See also NIGEL GRIMWADE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: NEW PATTERNS OF
TRADE, PRODUCTION AND INVESTMENT 240-44 (1989) (discussing the qualities
of a Newly Industrializing Country and the twenty-seven countries that could
qualify for such a status). Accordingly, NICs tend to be more advanced than
other developing countries and less so than developed countries. There is no
official or undisputed set of criteria to define an NIC, so each author sets a list of
countries according to her own criteria and methods.
94 Just consider, for instance, the fact that China already has the same number
of mobile-phone users-five-hundred million-as all of Europe.. See
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
capture a disproportionally large portion of the foreign direct
investment that flows to developing countries." Only Brazil,
Mexico, South Africa, China, India, Malaysia, Philippines,
Thailand, and Turkey would be considered NICs by popular
categorization methods.6
Back to the Emerging Economies' taxonomy, they arguably
hold political power to improve access to the world's intellectual
output and thus lead remaining developing countries." Their
macroeconomics facilitates their growing ability to challenge
TRIPS to adapt towards developed countries. Given these
characteristics, the Emerging Economies henceforth serve as the
focal point of the empirical analysis herein."
"[M]ost efforts have concentrated on understanding the process
in industrialized advanced countries rather than in developing
ones."99 UNESCO statistical reporting concerning developing
countries as of 2010,'"' however, is now offering alternative
empirical headway. As the UNESCO report suggests, developing
countries' innovation systems and associated R&D or Gross
Domestic Expenditure on R&D ("GERD") measurement systems
exhibit wide variety."o' "This variety possibly encompasses an
Technology in Emerging Economies: Of Internet Cafes and Power Cuts, THE
ECONOMIST, February 9, 2008, http://www.economist.com/ node/10640716.
9 In turn, the remaining developing countries receive proportionally much
smaller shares of FDI. See, e.g., Ilene Grabel, Internaitonal Private Capital
Flows and Developing Countries, in RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS,
327-28 (Ha-Joon Chang ed., 2003) ("FDI flows are ... highly concentrated in
roughly ten large, middle-income countries . . . China, Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Malaysia, Poland, Chile, South Korea, Thailand, and Venezuela.").
96 See DAVID WAUGH, GEOGRAPHY, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 576 (2000)
(explaining that Newly Industrialized Countries are those developing countries
who achieved a considerable level of industrialization).
97 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and the Emerging
Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, IILJ Working Paper 2009/5, 1, 3, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1442785.
98 See id. at 1.
99 See Swaminathan, supra note 12, at 1.
1oo See UNESCO, supra note 82.
'0o See id. at 7.
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uneven concentration of R&D performers as well as an unequal
empirical capacity to measure R&D [or GERD]."'O2
Emerging Economies leading the developing world as hotbeds
for state-of-the-art innovation do most of the innovative activity
thereof. In conjunction with innovation by developed countries,
this Article proposes a conceptual and empirical comparison
between the two groups of the North-South divide. This section
thus offers a comparison between the twenty-four Emerging
Economies as the hallmark of innovative developing countries,
with the thirty-two Advanced Economies listed by the IMF as of
16 July, 2012.'
The model attempts to approximate innovation of state-of-the-
art technology by the two country groups alongside the
developing-developed potential innovation divide. The proposed
model corresponds with Ed Mansfield's definition of the
propensity to patent as the percentage of patentable inventions that
are in fact patented.'" The propensity to patent is expressed in
"per firm" terms. "Per firm" means the percentage of innovative
firms in a sector that have applied for at least one patent over a
defined time period.'
In the early 1980s, as Scherer argued, not much was known
about the systematic nature of the propensity to patent.10 6 Since
102Id. at 13.
103 See World Economic and Financial Surveys, supra note 91 (stating that as
of July 16, 2012 Advanced Economies include: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxemburg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, and United
States).
104 See Mansfield, supra note 1; Dreyfuss, supra note 97.
los Isabelle Kabla, The Patent as Indicator ofInnovation, 1 NAT'L INST. STAT.
& ECON. STUD. 56-71 (1996). But see Georg Licht & Konrad Zoz, Patents and
R&D: An Econometric Investigation Using Applications for German, European,
and US Patents by German Companies 3-4 (Zentrum fur Europaische
Wirtschaftsforschung, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 96-19, 1996) (offering
empirical evidence whereby large firms enjoy a higher patent propensity rate
than small firms).
106 Frederick Scherer, The Propensity to Patent, I INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 107,
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then, a growing stream of research of patented inventions has
analyzed the extent to which patents are a reliable indicator of
innovative activity. Five recent studies have estimated that
elasticity of patent propensity is generally found to be positively
corroborating the results of the patent/GERD correlation.o' All the
studies, however, were based on surveys performed solely on
cross-sectional or panel data at the firm or industry-level within the
developed world.' Within these narrow parameters, largely
avoiding country and country cluster analysis, the propensity to
patent literature focused on the following indications: differences
between industries,'0 9 the type of institution and the type of
107-08 (1983) ("[T]he quantity and quality of industrial patenting may depend
upon chance, how readily a technology lends itself to patent protection, and
business decision-makers' varying perceptions of how much advantage they will
derive from patent rights[.]").
107 See generally Mansfield, supra note 1; C. T. TAYLOR & Z. A. SILBERSTON,
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM-A STUDY OF THE BRITISH
EXPERIENCE (1973); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh,
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000); J&6me Danguy et al., The R&D-Patent Relationship:
An Industry Perspective (ECARES Working Paper No. 2010-038, 2010);
Emmanuel Duguet & Isabelle Kabla, Appropriation Strategy and the
Motivations to Use the Patent System: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm
Level in French Manufacturing (NAT'L INST. STAT. & EcON. STUD. Working
Paper No. G 9717, 2010). To illustrate, the largest survey so far for the United
States is a 1996 survey by Cohen, Nelson & Walsh, which offered preliminary
patent propensity rates for innovations, weighted by R&D expenditures, for a
survey of 1065 American research laboratories in manufacturing. They report
that a patent application was made for 51.5% of product innovations and for
33.0% of process innovations between 1991 and 1993. See Wesley M. Cohen,
R. Richard Nelson & John Walsh, Appropriability Conditions and Why Firms
Patent and Why They Do Not in the American Manufacturing Sector, Paper
presented to THE ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. CONFERENCE ON NEW
S&T INDICATORS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY (1996).
108 See Danguy, supra note 107, at 2; liro Milkinen, The Propensity to Patent:
An Empirical Analysis at the Innovation Level, Paper presented to ETLA-
RESEARCH INST. FIN. ECON. 2 (2007) available at
http://www.epip.eulconferences/epip02/files/MAKINENThepropensity to-pa
tentpdf.
See, e.g., James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software
Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 171-73 (2007); Cohen, Nelson &
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research,"' or the indices of "patent rights" based on the "strength"
of patent systems.'" To a limited degree, diversity within the
propensity to patent led also to macroeconomics-related analysis.
This analysis again focused almost entirely on differences across
developed countries." 2
Walsh, supra note 107; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The
Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the US.
Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J.ECON. 101, at 111-12.
110 See, e.g., Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie & Carine Peeters,
Introduction: Advanced Research Findings and Fields for Further Research in
Economics and Management of Intellectual Property, in APPLIED
ECONOMETRICS Ass'N SERIES, ECON. AND MGMT. PERSPECTIVES ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS (2006); see generally Michele Cincera, Firms'
Productivity Growth and R&D Spillovers: An Analysis of Alternative
Technological Proximity Measures, 14 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 657
(2005).
1' Theoretical work emerged with Ginarte and Park in 1997, and the updated
versions published by Park in 2008 for 110 countries. See Walter Park,
International Patent Protection: 1960-2005, 37 RESEARCH POL'Y 761, 2
(2008). See generally Juan C. -Ginarte & Walter Park, Determinants of Patent
Rights: A Cross-National Study, 26 RESEARCH POL'Y 283 (1997) (computing an
index of patent strength, also known as the IPI index, or intellectual property
index). In 2002, Josh Lerner expanded this approach for 60 countries, defining
"strong" patent systems as those that are essentially applicant friendly. See Josh
Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years 4-6 (Nat'l Bureau
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8977, 2002) (examining the patent laws of a
comprehensive number of countries from 1960 to 1990, considering five
components of the laws, namely the duration of protection, extent of coverage,
membership in international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection,
and enforcement measures).
112 See Jonathan Eaton, Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, International
Patenting and the European Patent Office: A Quantitative Assessment, in
PATENTS, INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 27 (2004) (solely analyzing
European patenting patterns by advanced economies). Laura Bottazzi and
Giovanni Peri estimated the relationship between employment in R&D and
generation of knowledge as measured by patent applications across OECD
countries. See Laura Bottazzi & Giovanni Peri, The International Dynamics of
R&D and Innovation in the Short and in the Long Run (Nat'l Bureau Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11524, 2005). Jeffrey L. Furman, Michael E.
Porter, and Scott Stem introduced a novel framework based on the concept of
"national innovative capacity" as the ability of a country to produce and
commercialize a flow of innovative technology over the long term. See Jeffrey
N.C. J.L. &TECH.
B. Methodology
The proposed model adheres to four methodological principles.
At the outset, the analysis adheres to a formal statistical inference
method to estimate the effect and the associated statistical
significance of two hypotheses explained infra Part II.C."' The
statistical comparison for patent propensity rates between the two
groups of Advanced and Emerging Economies is modeled as
follows. The number of patents corresponding to each pair (year,
country) depends on the country, the year, and the GERD invested
(during the third previous year per granted patents in a three year
average delay at the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO")) and on the type."l4
In the econometric model appropriate for present panel data,
the dependent variable is the expected value of the yearly number
of issued patents."' The explanatory variables include GERD (as
offset), the country, the year, and the type, changing throughout
time. This is expressed as interaction between the year and the
group country classification (namely both Emerging Economies
and Advanced Economies as the IMF classifies them). The
L. Furman, Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, The Determinants of National
Innovative Capacity, 31 RESEARCH POL'Y 899 (2002). The survey uses a
sample of seventeen OECD countries from 1973 through 1996. Few narrow
exceptions for the focus on developed countries in examining patent propensity-
related indications exist. Id. See, e.g., David Matthew Waguespack, J6hanna
Kristin Birnir & Jeff Schroeder, Technological Development and Political
Stability: Patenting in Latin America and the Caribbean, 34 RESEARCH POL'Y
1570, 1572 (2005) (accounting for political stability or lack thereof over the
propensity to patent by Latin American countries).
113 The data analyzed formally for all countries will have at least four values
of GERD and GERD-related data. The range of the available years of data is
seven years at least (maximal year minus minimal year is equal to or greater
than seven).
114 The type effect is statistically assumed to be changing throughout time.
"15 The statistical assumption is that the number is distributed as a negative
binomial. The latter type of distribution is a distribution of discrete probability
of the number of successes in a sequence of Bernoulli trials before a specified
(non-random) number of failures (denoted r) occur. In statistical terms, a
Bernoulli trial is each repetition of an experiment involving only two outcomes.
See JOSEPH M. HILBE, NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION 185-87 (Diana
Gillooly et al. eds., 2007).
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longitudinal structure of the data (panel data) induces serial
correlation between yearly observations corresponding to the same
country, which were taken into account by the model.
A second principle follows. It adheres to a panel data counting
method relates to the choice of a patent category search with the
USPTO dataset. The model analyzes the USPTO granted patents.
Thus, the model recognizes that issued patents, as opposed to
patent applications, effectively serve as a proxy for R&D-related
state-of-the-art quality output assurance. This is important because
patent series are, by nature, subject to a substantial bias, with most
patents generating low or no value and a few patents being
associated with high economic value. Presently, patent statistics
studies rarely thoroughly test the quality sensitivity of the results of
the patent count methodology or the data source."' The qualitative
methodological improvement in the proposed model counts
archetypical state-of-the-art technology, which has successfully
culminated as issued patents, instead of the mere filing of related
patent applications. This methodological choice addresses the
concern whereby the quantative innovative activity does not begin
or otherwise conclude the patenting process, but in patents being
prosecuted and finally granted."' Surely, only state-of-the-art
technology that completes the USPTO patenting process is
accounted for as issued patents. It is, therefore, a limitation of
present patent statistics methods to measure patent applications as
an indication of quality innovation."'
116 See ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., OECD SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
AND INDUSTRY SCOREBOARD 2011, 1, 7 (2011); Danguy et al., supra note 107.
" See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 4
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 8498, 2001) (presenting main
trends in U.S. patenting over the last 30 years, including a variety of original
measures constructed with citation data).
11s Patent statistics literature has irregularly considered this limitation. The
earliest, most important contribution begins with Zvi Grilliches. See Zvi
Grilliches, Patent statistics as economic indicators: a survey, 28 J. EcON.
LITERATURE, 1661, 1696-97 (1990); see also Daniele Archibugi and Mario
Pianta, Measuring Technological Change Through Patents and Innovation
Surveys, 16 TECHNOVATION 451, 455 (1996) (offering an overview of recent
81
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Another approach within the patent statistics literature has
partly met this qualitative challenge. Instead of seeking to make
inferences about the propensity to patent by estimating the patent
production function, surveys have directly asked the firms about
the fraction of innovations they generally patent.l 9 This approach
allows for the construction of a direct measure of the propensity to
patent that is closely in line with the theoretical definition of the
propensity to patent as the fraction of innovations that are
accounted for as USPTO issued patents.
There are two additional methodological challenges concerning
patent propensity measurement of developing countries per se.
First, measuring patent propensity rates (as a proxy for innovation)
by equivocating propensity to the number of patent applications
filed poses a challenge.12 0 With developing countries in particular,
often many patent applications do not lead to patent issuance,
research using innovation surveys and patent data as indicators of technological
activity).
"9 Alfred Kleinknecht, Kees Van Montfort, and Erik Brouwer offer to replace
patent/R&D rate analysis with measuring expenditure on innovation (including
non-R&D-expenditure), sales of innovative products known which may be
interpreted as an indicator of imitation, or otherwise innovation not introduced
earlier by competitors, which may be interpreted as an indicator of "true"
innovation. See Alfred Kleinknecht, Kees Van Montfort & Erik Brouwer, The
Non-Trivial Choice Between Innovation Indicators, 11 ECON. INNOVATION &
NEW TECH. 109, 113-14 (2002) (analyzing four alternative innovation
indicators: R&D, patent applications, total innovation expenditure, and shares
in sales taken by imitative and by innovative products measured in the
Netherlands).
120 See, e.g., Anthony Arundel & Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of
Innovations are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms, 27
RESEARCH POL'Y 127, 131 (1998); Emmanuel Duguet & Isabelle Kabla,
Appropriation Strategy and the Motivations to use the Patent System: An
Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level in French Manufacturing, 49/50
ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 289, 294 (1998); Mansfield, supra note 1, at 176 n.10
(adding neighboring methodological concerns, including the difficulty to
estimate the proportion of patentable inventions that is disclosed and that unless
the firm actually files, it may not be absolutely certain that a particular invention
is patentable). Firms have become more disillusioned with the patent system
and as they have devised other ways of protecting their technology thereby
witnessing a lower propensity to patent between the late 1960s and early 1980s
through the patents granted to U.S. inventors. Id. at 178-79
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either nationally or at the USPTO level. The proposed method,
therefore, corresponds with the above mentioned methodological
definition of the propensity to patent as the percentage of
patentable inventions that are, in fact, patented.121
A second patent panel data counting method and challenge
relating to the particularities of the USPTO dataset follows.
Patents are analyzed by the USPTO Inventor Country Nationality
("ICN") or United States Inventor State ("IS") search categories.
These categories contain the country or state of residence of the
inventor at the time of patent issue.'2 2 The ICN search category
indicates the inventiveness of the local laboratories and labor force
of a given country.
This counting method has never been used in earlier propensity
to patent research and it enjoys three important advantages in
comparison to all of the above mentioned methods of accounting
for patent applications or other quantitative variations thereof.
First, it replaces the "Patent Affiliate" or "Owner" alternative
USPTO search categories, which mostly represent patenting
activity by multi-national enterprises originating in advanced
economies.'23 Second, the measurement of the ICN or IS search
categories operate to minimize transaction costs associated with
domestic patenting by developing countries. To illustrate, in the
Mexican maize breeding industry, information, certification and
enforcement costs were high enough to hamper the incentive effect
121 Mansfield, supra note 1, at 178-79.
122 Tips on Fielded Searching (Inventor Country (ICN)), U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE (2012), http://www.uspto.gov/patft/help/ helpflds.htm#
Inventor Country.
123 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL
(2009) available at http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/free/9209021e.
pdf. See generally EMMANUEL HASSAN, OHID YAQUB & STEPHANIE
DIEPEVEEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2010); Anna Bergek & Maria Bruzelius, Patents
with Inventors from Diferent Countries: Exploring Some Methodological
Issues Through a Case Study, Paper presented at the DRUID CONFERENCE ON
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION: ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND
SYSTEMS 6 (2005).
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of intellectual property rights.'24 Similar conclusions were reached
for a firm-level panel after the strengthening of intellectual
property protection in Japan.'2 5 A following methodological
advantage with the ICN search category choice concerns co-
invention measurement. In some cases, at least one of the
inventors on a patent belonging to an Emerging Economy may be
foreign and may belong to an Advanced Economy nation.'2 6 The
ICN search category solves this problem because it may account
for either sole or co-inventions. All the same, USPTO co-
inventions comprise roughly one percent of total inventions
patented at the USPTO. 27
With that said, there is need to account for the methodological
choice whereby using the granted patent search category this study
focuses solely at USPTO patenting activity. The reason for not
expanding this article beyond the USPTO to the European or
Japanese patent office is, however, undependable. To date, neither
of the two other leading patent offices, namely the European and
Japanese, which, including the USPTO, are jointly referred to as
the "Triadic Patent family" (consolidated to eliminate double
counting of patents filed at different offices) 2 8 -offer equivalent
ICN search categories.
Furthermore, the rationales underlying the focus on USPTO-
based patenting activity instead of the alternative aggregation of
national patenting systems of both Advanced and Emerging
Economies are twofold. The first reason is that countries,
especially in the developing world, do not have the same
124 See Andrianne Lger, Intellectual Property Rights in Mexico: Do They
Play a Role?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1865, 1875-76 (2005).
125 Mariko Sakakibara & Lee Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More
Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND
J. OF EcoN. 77, 77-100 (2001).
126 OECD, supra note 123.
127 Patel & Vega, supra note 15; Adam. B. Jaffe, Manuel Trajtenberg &
Rebecca Henderson, Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations, 108 Q. J. OF ECON. 577, 577-98 (1993). See
generally ORG. FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. COMPENDIUM OF PATENT
STATISTICS, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND STATISTICS (2004).
128 See OECD, supra note 123, at 71.
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patentability criteria. 129 A second reason is that such countries may
substantively differ in their national grant rates.' 30 Both of these
methodological partialities are mostly solved by USPTO-based
patenting statistics based on the ICN search category whereby
issued patents are sampled.
To be sure, the probable importance of future designed
uniformed Triadic Inventor Country Nationality search category
would support the fact whereby most R&D-related activity is
concentrated in these geo-political regions."' Yet, in balance, a
mitigating finding in support of this study's USPTO-based analysis
holds that on average, only between ten to fifteen percent of patent
priority filings become triadic patents in the first place whereas for
the rest there is USPTO dominance for issued patents by foreign
inventors.'32
The proposed model also addresses the differences in price
levels among countries and country groups."' The method
employs a third methodological principle. It uses a calculation
method whereby total domestic intramural expenditure on R&D
during a given period by both Advanced and Emerging Economies
country groups is expressed in Purchasing Power Parity ("PPP")
United States Dollars by 2005 constant prices. ' This serves as a
calculation of competing national rates by currency conversion into
United States Dollars. Then, expenditures on GNP for different
national price indices are converted into a common currency by
means of the PPP per 2005 constant prices; they are, in effect,
expressed at the same set of national prices so that comparisons
129 See Dominique Guellec & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, The
Impact of Public R&D Expenditure on Business R&D (OECD Science,
Technology and Industry Working Papers, No. 2000/4, 2000).
130 Id. at 8.
131 Jacques Gaillard, Measuring R&D in Developing Countries: Main
Characteristics and Implications for the Frascati Manual, 15(1) SC. TECH. &
Soc. 77, 81 (2010).
132 Danguy et al., supra note 107.
1 Id.
134 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) Glossary-63 Terms for Science & Technology, http://glossary.
uis.unesco.org/glossary/map/terms/177 (last visited Oct. 2, 2013) (explaining
this methodology was adapted from OECD (2002), Frascati Manual, § 423).
N.C.J.L. & TECH.
between countries reflect only differences in the volume of GERD-
related goods and services purchased. This method thereby
normalizes the patent propensity rate comparison between
emerging and advanced country groups classifications."'
This study abides by a fourth methodological principle.
Accordingly, the model uses statistical imputation to resolve
patterns of patenting of GERD-related missingness for each year,
country, and country group. Patent data at the USPTO website is
available with no missing values for the entire sixteen years
between 1996 and 2011. GERD-related data covers fifteen years
between 1996 and 2010 with missing values. In some cases, no
reliable imputation is possible because the range of time for which
data is available is too narrow, such as with the case of the GERD
date from the Philippines which has been deleted from the model
presented in this Article. Whenever imputation methodology is
statistically permissible, the following rules are used in calculating
missing data. First, if there is missing data before the first
available data point, the study uses the rule "first data carried
before," thereby assigning the same value to all data points before
the first available. Second, if there is missing data after the last
available data point, the study uses the rule "last data carried over,"
thereby assigning the same value to all data points after the last one
available. Third, if there is missing data between two data points,
the study uses an interpolation between the two data points. The
primary statistical analysis per the first two rules above showed
that there were thirty-one countries (fifty-five percent) with full
data, so that imputation was not required.
As a whole, the methodology used in the model adheres to the
conceptualization and critique put forth by two OECD statistical
manuals: the OECD Frascati Manual (2002) on R&D & GERD-
related statistics'3 6 and the OECD/Eurostat Oslo Manual (2005) on
13 id.
136 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., PROPOSED
STANDARD PRACTICE FOR SURVEYS ON RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT: FRASCATI MANUAL 121 (defining GERD), 129-51 (giving basic
definitions) (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. ed., 6th ed. 2002).
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innovation-related statistics.'17 Both manuals put emphasis on the
need to move beyond normative posturing by stakeholders, role
players, and policy makers, to empirical observations. The
OECD's Frascati Manual is the de facto standard for the
internationally comparable measurement of R&D and GERD of
OECD member states and associated observer states for the last
fifty years.' The proposed model also adheres to two additional
noticeable OECD manuals. The first of the two is the UNESCO
Technical Paper No. 5, titled: Measuring R&D: Challenges Faced
by Developing Countries (2010).13 This manual provides
guidance on a number of methodological challenges that are
relevant to developing countries and which may not have been
elaborated clearly enough in the Frascati Manual. Second is the
OECD's Patent Statistics Manual of 2009,1'4 which provides users
and producers of patent statistics with basic guidelines used herein
for compiling and analyzing such data. The latter manuals hold
out the Frascati Manual as the most widely accepted international
standard practice for R&D & GERD-related surveys.
C. Findings
1. The North-South Patent Propensity Divide
Two hypotheses were tested and the results supported both.
The first of two hypotheses is that there is a significant yearly
statistical difference (gap) in the patent propensity rates between
emerging economies and advanced economies. This corroborates
the notion that developing and developed countries are separated
by a gap in an international propensity to patent.
'3 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv. & EUROSTAT, OSLO
MANUAL: GUIDELINES FOR COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING INNOVATION DATA
64-65 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed., 3d ed. 2005) (offering
breakdown by type of innovation activity).
138 See generally Benoit Godin, On the Origins of Bibliometrics, 68
SCIENTOMETRICS 109 (2006) (offering a study on the history and present
methods bibliometric measurement).
139 See UNESCO, Measuring R&D: Challenges Faced by Developing
Countries (UIS Technical Paper No. 5) (2010), available at http://www.uis.
unesco.org/Library/Documents/tech%205-eng.pdf.
140 See OECD, supra note 123.
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The finding is shown with regard to the number of USPTO
Issued Patents cataloging per national R&D expenditure measured
as a percentage of GERD.14' The finding upholds the argument
that patent propensity rates by the two country clusters are
comparatively non-linear instead of the linear rate promoted in
neoclassical innovation literature and by organs of the United
Nations as described.
Table 2 below offers a graphical illustration of two examples of
yearly differences in country group classification in 1999 and
2011. As Table 2 shows, both examples uphold a significant
clustered difference between Advanced Economies (colored in
gray) and Emerging Economies (colored in white) concerning the
patent propensity rates of their country members.
141 Id. at 12.
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Table 2: Patents/GERD ($100M)-Examples for 1999, 2011
Year 1999
Country Pat/GERD ($OOM)
Hong Kong 56.88
United States 46.02
Japan 33.07
Canada 29.23
Israel 28.40
Switzerland 28.31
Finland 25.69
Denmark 24.11
Sweden 21.14
Germany 21.03
Korea 20.29
Belgium 18.58
New Zealand 18.16
Netherlands 18.07
Austria 16.70
United Kingdom 14.72
France 12.97
Italy 12.75
Ireland 12.53
Singapore 12.46
Malaysia 12.21
Australia 11.76
Luxembourg 11.57
Thailand 11.37
Latvia 11.11
Iceland 10.50
Norway 9.27
South Africa 7.56
Hungary 6.72
Peru 5.25
Spain 4.94
Mexico 4.03
Argentina 4.00
Slovenia 3.78
Greece 3.20
Lithuania 3.14
Bulgaria 2.97
Slovakia 2.83
Russian Federation 2.49
Czech Republic 2.35
Poland 1.99
India 1.66
Brazil 1.46
Ukraine 1.34
Estonia 1.27
China 1.24
Portugal 1.09
Turkey 0.56
Pakistan 0.53
Romania 0.50
Cyprus 0.00
Malta 0.00
Legend:
Advanced Economy
Emerging Economy
Year 2011
Country Pat/GERD(SIDOM)
United States 41.58
Japan 35.65
Korea 32.28
Canada 30.26
Switzerland 29.96
Israel 25.96
Hong Kong 25.29
New Zealand 24.11
Netherlands 22.68
Germany 19.47
Belgium 19.12
freland 18.59
Denmark 18.44
Sweden 1833
Finland 17.08
United Kingdom 16.68
Bulgaria 14.42
Singapore 14.42
France 14.33
Australia 14.29
Austria 14.00
Norway 13.50
Luxembourg 13.34
Malaysia 13.24
Italy 13.17
Malta 11.45
Thailand 10.66
Iceland 9.10
Hungary 8.10
India 7.85
Cyprus 7.68
Latvia 6.90
Slovakia 5.74
Greece 5.71
Estonia 4.65
China 4.50
Slovenia 4.39
Spain 4.27
Czech Republic 4.22
Peru 4.07
Romania 3.94
South Afica 3.76
Argentina 3.69
Mexico 3.58
Poland 3.56
Lithuania 2.52
Russian Federation 2.17
Ukraine 1.78
Brazil 1.65
Portugal 1.36
Turkey 1.29
Pakistan 0.54
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Table 3: Patents/GERD ($100M)-All Countries, All Years
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Table 3 above further offers an aggregated summary for all years
between 1999 and 2011. Tables 2 and 3 correspond to the
statistical difference for every individual year thereof. The
difference is further found to be highly significant for all thirteen
years, with changes in its magnitude during the years.
For the preparation of Tables 2 and 3, boxplots were drawn for
each country classification. Advanced Economies are displayed in
yellow, and Emerging Economies are displayed in green. The final
boxplot presented in Table 4 below displays the yearly log of the
ratio per number of Patents/GERD (in $100 Million (U.S.)) to
compare country classifications.
Table 4: Boxplots for Countries Classified as 1 vs.
Countries Classified as 2
-7
7 T 7T
0 -10
-12Ya a
Year and Month
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2. Emerging Economies Upward Convergence
The second hypothesis shows that the patent propensity rate
gap between the two country clusters slowly, yet steadily decreases
between 1996 and 2011. The difference was shown to be
significantly smaller at the end of the time range compared with
the beginning by a factor of 0.77. Table 5 and Graph 1 below
show the estimated pattern of change in the gap, which
systematically decreases over time. Table 5 below displays
estimated values, conveniently marked in yellow (based on the
fitted model) on the log Patents/GERD scale of the difference per
year between the two classifications. Table 5 predicts a decline
from -1.5509 in 1999 to -1.277 in 2011 as also shown in Graph 1
below.
Table 5: Estimated Yearly Differences of the Log Patents per
GERD Between the Two Groups of Countries
Obs Strnt Effiect Slice Clas Clas Estimate StdErr DF TValue Probt
No sific sificat
ation ion
I I Year* 99 I 2 -1.5509 0.1283 65.58 -12.09 <.0001
Classification
2 1 Year* 00 1 2 -1.6516 0.1360 82.44 -12.14 <.0001
Classification
3 1 Year* 01 1 2 -1.5554 0.1241 16.48 -12.54 <.0001
Classification
4 1 Year* 02 1 2 -1.5944 0.1227 27.23 -12.99 <.0001
Classification
5 1 Year* 03 1 2 1.5056 0.1177 21.86 -12.79 <.0001
Classification
6 I Year* 04 1 2 -1.5513 0.1173 51.63 -13.23 <.0001
Classification
7 1 Year* 05 1 2 -1.4961 0.1189 37.66 -12.58 <.0001
Classification
8 1 Year* 06 1 2 -1.4191 0.1183 52.60 -11.99 <.0001
Classification
9 I Year* 07 1 2 -1.3952 0.1170 58.93 -11.92 <.0001
Classification
10 1 Year* 08 1 2 -1.3610 0.1115 35.58 -12.20 <.0001
Classification
II I Year* 09 1 2 -1.4053 0.1148 141.60 -12.24 <.0001
Classification
12 1 Year* 10 1 2 -1.3834 0.1127 38.55 -12.27 <.0001
Classification
13 Year* I 1 2 -1.2770 0.0897 3.183 -14.23 0.0005
Classification 2
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Graph 1: Estimated Yearly Difference of the Log Patents per
GERD Between the Two Groups of Countries
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The empirical finding combined by Table 5 and Graph 1
follows the first hypothesis in validating the statistical gap between
the two country-group classification based on their patent
propensity rates. More specifically, it shows that the propensity to
patent by the Emerging Economies cluster is slowly and steadily
growing following a homogeneous marginal return of increase as
compared to Advanced Economies.142 This archetypical form of
"upward convergence" is a case of poorer club members-the
142 But see HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: POLICIES AND
INSTITUTIONS FOR ECONoMIC DEVELOPMENT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 2
(2003) (arguing that TRIPS may increase the gap between the most
technologically advanced and the least technologically advanced nations);
CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: A SCEPTICAL VIEW 2-3, 126-
27 (2002) (debunking the role of the state in the midst of globalization of
internationalized innovation and R&D). See generally Carlota Perez & Luc L.
Soete, Catching-Up in Technology: Entry Barriers and Windows of
Opportunity, in TECHNICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 458 (1988).
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cluster of Emerging Economies in this case-catching up to
wealthier members-Advanced Economies herein.'43
This basic empirical finding may correspond with "catch-up"
literature concerning the pulling of other countries through a
"catch-up" effect: In a recent seminal article, Harvard University
economist Jr~me Vandenbussche and others state that the strength
of this "catch-up" effect at the developing countries' frontier in
fact decreases with the level of domestic technological creation.'"
As others have shown, as a result, technology creation by domestic
firms may become progressively more important as a country
moves closer to the technology frontier whereby technology
diffusion and absorption declines. That is, catching up possibly
translates into increasingly smaller technological improvement
protected through incremental patenting activity.145
Thus far, endogenous growth economics has been rather poorly
measured empirically. The empirical challenge is acute at the
regional level.'46  As the evidence suggests, "the key factors
stressed by endogenous growth theory-increasing returns, human
capital, and technology-develop unevenly across the space
economy and are locally and regionally differentiated."'4 7 Earlier
accounts of endogenous growth theory's relation to club
convergence between country groups have mostly been attributed
to the understanding of archetypical club convergence over
143 See, e.g., Dan Ben-David, Convergence Clubs and Subsistence Economies,
55 J. DEV. ECON. 155, 159 (1998).
' See J6r6me Vandenbussche, Philippe Aghion & Costas Meghir, Growth,
Distance to Frontier and Composition of Human Capital, 11 J. ECON. GROWTH
97, 98 (2006) (using a panel of nineteen OECD countries to show how as a
country gets closer to economic growth, it relies more and more on innovation);
see generally HASSAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 17.
145 See HASSAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 17. The latter argument concerning
incremental patenting is outside the scope of this paper.
146 See Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous
Growth Theory and Regional Development, 74 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 201, 220
(1988).
147 id
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salaries, GDP, and other macroeconomic income-related
indications.'4 8
Little accounts for endogenous convergence between country
groups or clubs and domestic technological creation. Not much is
known about how domestic technology creation is achieved
through diffusion of technology through technological transfer
from northern to southern country group clusters. 4 9 Moreover,
very little is conceptually attributed to explaining how
technological creation of country group clusters is determined.'o
In fact, the only finding by this Article's second hypothesis
concerning club convergence negates regional divergence between
Advanced and Emerging Economies, showing the slow yet steady
closure of this North-South patent propensity divide. In other
words, slow regional convergence of innovation by Emerging
Economies towards Advanced Economies measured through patent
propensity rates is more telling than opposite regional divergence
by the former country group.'1'
148 Cf, Ben-David, supra note 143, at 169 (concluding that income gaps have
increased within most possible groupings of countries in the world and that
''convergence clubs" tend to be more prevalent at the two ends of the income
spectrum).
149 See Martin & Sunley, supra note 146, at 210 (citation omitted); STILIANOS
ALEXIADIS, CONVERGENCE CLUBS AND SPATIAL EXTERNALITIES: MODELS AND
APPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE 61, 80-87 (Manfred M.
Fischer et al. eds., 2013) (stating that such diffusion of technology requires that
"technologically lagging economies have -an infrastructure and appropriate
conditions that will allow the effective adoption of new technology"); GEORGE
H. BORTS & JEROME L. STEIN, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A FREE MARKET 1 (1964)
(offering a classic study of regional development in the United States); Jeffrey
G. Williamson, Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development:
A Description of the Patterns, 13 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 1, 3-4
(1965) (analyzing the evolution of regional income differences in advanced
industrial countries).
'5o See ALEXIADIS, supra note 149.
But see Martin & Sunley, supra note 146, at 210 (referring to "the models
of regional growth advanced by writers such as Perroux (1950, 1955), Myrdal
(1957), and Kaldor (1970, 1981) [which] predict that regional incomes will tend
to diverge, because market forces, if left to their own devices, are spatially
disequilibrating.").
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Some earlier work has been done on cross-sectional patent
propensity, with practically no emphasis on regional country group
comparisons. In the 1980s, Jan Fagerberg used cross-sectional and
time-series data for only twenty-five industrial countries for the
period 1960-1983. This rather limited sample included, in
addition to nineteen OECD countries, only six of the most
important industrial economies from the non-OECD area.
Fagerberg's study thus served as an early significant, albeit partial,
confirmation that there exists a close correlation between the level
of economic development, measured as GDP per capita, and the
level of technological development, measured through R&D or
patent statistics. 15 2
Notwithstanding the present empirical absence of data on the
exact growth model, exogenous or endogenous, this Article
indicates that market forces may have failed in disequilibrating
Advanced Economies in their relative country group progression
towards that patent propensity rate that characterizes advanced
economies. This finding corresponds with William Baumol and
Edward Wolff's utilization of data from seventy-two countries
demonstrates that middle income countries-seventeen out of
seventy-two countries in the sample, mostly corresponding to the
emerging economies cluster-have grown the fastest.15 1
152 For equivalent "Technology Gap" literature, see Jan Fagerberg, A
Technology Gap Approach to why Growth Rates Differ, 16 RES POL'Y 87, 87-89
(1987); Jan Fagerberg, International Competitiveness, 98 ECON J. 355, 364
(1988). See generally Jan Fagerberg, Technology and International Differences
in Growth Rates, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1147 (1994); Fulvio Castellacci,
Convergence and Divergence Among Technology Clubs, (DRUID Working
Paper No. 06-21 2006) (supporting the idea of the existence of clubs of countries
characterized by different levels of technological development and different
technological dynamics).
153 See Williams J. Baumol & Edward N. Wolff, Productivity Growth,
Convergence, and Welfare: Reply, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 1155, 1156 (1988)
(finding that the poorest countries have diverged from other country groups).
See generally HOLLIS CHENERY ET AL., INDUSTRIALIZATION AND GROWTH: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1986) (combining time-series and cross-sectional data
for several countries while finding divergence among the poorer countries and
convergence among the relatively wealthier countries); THORKIL KRISTENSEN,
DEVELOPMENT IN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES (2d ed. 1982) (focusing on the
96 [VOL. 15: 49
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Additionally, the present Article's findings concerning patent
propensity club convergence tentatively corresponds with the
recent United Nations position on innovation regional
convergence. In the 2005 UNCTAD World Investment Report, the
authors warn of a widening technological gap between developing
countries taking part in the "global innovation network" and those
failing to do so in the developing world. The UNCTAD report is
germane to this Article's finding concerning emerging economies,
as it points out that developing nations, particularly in Asia, are
becoming increasingly successful in attracting investment in R&D
from multinational corporations. On balance, the UNCTAD's
findings tentatively uphold that developing countries that are weak
in R&D-presumably excluded from being Emerging
Economies-need to adopt appropriate policies if they are to
benefit from this trend.'54 For example, the UNCTAD report finds
that more than sixty percent of the multinational corporations
surveyed by UNCTAD plan to expand their research activities in
China. For India, the figure was 29.5 percent. '5  In contrast,
however, few such corporations plan to increase R&D in Africa or
Latin America (except in Brazil, Mexico, Morocco and South
Africa).'"' These important, yet incomplete, UNCTAD findings
are more significant concerning possible club divergence between
middle-income or Emerging Economies and weak developing
countries in innovation. Yet, the findings also serve to
demonstrate how through the measurement of FDI and the global
investment in R&D with the intervention of multinational
corporations preliminary indication of upward convergence from
Emerging Economies to Advanced Economies is also accounted
for.
cross-section alone, grouped countries by their 1974 income levels and found a
hump-shaped relationship between group's 1970-1979 growth rates and their
income levels with the middle-income groups enjoying higher rates of growth
than the wealthier and the poorer groups).
154 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 40 (2005).
15s Id. at 114.
16 Id. at 147.
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Finally, it should be noted that, in the long run, comparable
patent propensity rates as a proxy of innovation activity between
Advanced and Emerging Economies may uphold club divergence,
instead of convergence, due to deep international incompatibilities
in economic integration.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article shows that countries converge to multiple
equilibria rather than to a single one over their propensity to patent
as proxy for innovation.'" The divide over the propensity to patent
between developed and developing countries, approximated
through Advanced and Emerging Economies herein, may be
explained by a complex set of micro and macroeconomic
indicators. Future empirical analysis of the propensity to patent,
the divide and the exact country convergence clubs is necessary. A
full empirical account of the nooks and crannies of these
phenomena should ultimately lead to a novel non-linear innovation
theory and policy recommendations, including international
intellectual property-related ones.
For now, as a broad policy concern, legislation set to make
patenting easier either entices firms to patent a higher percentage
of their innovations or even to invest more in innovation. Yet,
even this basic proposition needs to be further solidified, because
economists such as R. Falvey and others state that having strong
intellectual property rights benefits both the richest and the poorest
nations, but probably not middle-income countries, such as
Emerging Economies.'
Such pro-patenting policies indeed carry complex implications
that lie beyond the scope of this Article.'59 As Arundel and Kabla
157 Cf Ben-David, supra note 143, at 158 (reaching an equivalently broad
conclusion concerning club convergence between separate country groups over
income-related indications).
158 See Rod Falvey, Neil Foster & David Greenaway, Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Growth, 10 REv. DEv. ECON. 700, 700 (2006).
159 Cf Anthony Arundel & Isabelle Kabla, What Percentage of Innovations
Are Patented? Empirical Estimates for European Firms, 27 REs. POL'Y 127, 128
(1998) (discussing numerous patent propensity methods).
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further add, such policies made "for example, to reduce the cost of
a patent application, could instead increase patent propensity rates
in some sectors that currently have low rates while having little
effect on firms or sectors where a majority of innovations are
already patented."' 60 These changes may otherwise lead to the
empirically uncorroborated reduction in patent quality altogether in
either advanced or emerging economies alike.' 6 '
The cluster analysis used by this Article may also give
cautionary political-economic messages. For example, Professor
Rochelle Dreyfuss explains that because Emerging Economies
represent demand by intellectual property consumers as much as
they do towards intellectual property creators, they may partner
with under-represented least-developed countries.16 With the
completion of this empirical project, additional political-economic
implications follow.
Finally, a word about the rule of law. The rule of law offered
through the TRIPS agreement and other such WTO
technologically-driven capitalist treaties is not the product of what
Ha-Joon Chang referred to as an "innocent scholastic
awakening.""' Instead, the rule of law represents interest in law
primarily as a response to the critique and failure of earlier World
Bank-led neoliberal policies as with the deriving WTO-led
exogenous growth policies upon their focus on technological
transfer and foreign direct investment-related stance for
innovation-based economic growth. As seen through the non-
linear characteristics of the patent propensity innovative divide
noted in this Article, although TRIPS requires the harmonization of
161 See OECD, supra note 116 (offering a novel innovation index upholding
that patent quality has declined steadily on an average of 20%); WIPO, supra
note 162 (concluding that patent quality varies from country to country
depending on national circumstances and level of development).
162 Dreyfuss, supra note 97.
163 Cf Ha-Joon Chang, Understanding the Relationship Between Institutions
and Economic Development: Some Key Theoretical Issues, 1, 4 (U.N. World
Institute for Development Economics Research, Discussion Paper No. 2006/05,
2006) (offering skepticism concerning rule of law-related post-Washington
consensus policies with emphasis on the role of the World Bank thereof).
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intellectual property rights protection, such harmonization is
neither clearly necessary nor sufficient for the South. The South's
lower patent propensity rates measured by their relatively lower
rates of state-of-the-art technology as USPTO granted patents
evermore stands in contradiction to nowadays "one size fits all"
innovation policy.
